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Introduction
The challenge of international environmental policy is gaining steadily more attention because an increasing number of pollution problems does not fit into the scope of mere, national treatment. Obviously, global problems like depleting the ozone layer, heatingup the atmosphere by emitting greenhouse gases and destroying biospheres demand international cooperation. However, international cooperation faces a lot of obstacles which originate at least from the sovereignty of countries. Sovereign countries cannot credibly commit to an agreement which is not self-enforcing. Self-enforcing agreements ensure that every country is always at least not worse off by sticking to the agreement than by breaching it.
Although the feature of infinite repetition can reconcile international environmental cooperation and self-enforcement, a lot of global problems are still on the international policy agenda. Infinite repetition can do its stabilizing job only if governments feel not only responsible for short terms. The results of the Earth Summit have revealed that such a workable cooperation is hard to emerge (Heister, Klepper, Stahler (1992) ). Thus, this paper considers international environmental policy still as a non-cooperative issue. It assumes that two countries i and j use a global international environmental resource by emitting pollutants.
However, I will enlarge the analysis of this static non-cooperative game by two aspects which the literature has neglected so far. 1 First, a country is not only able to improve the environmental quality by reducing emissions but also by adapting to changed environmental conditions. Most of the economic literature implicitly assumes reduction and adaptation to be strictly separable. On the contrary, I will assume that positive economies of scope exist between reduction and adaptation policies.
Second, managing environmental deterioration by adaptation policies can itself result in externalities for the other countries. Hence, I will add externality effects to the standard effects of adaptation policies. In doing so, I do not merely add an unchangeable suffer or benefit for either country because a country can modify the degree of externalities it suffers or enjoys by changing its reduction efforts which influence the adaptation policy of the other country through the scope effect. 1 For a discussion of international environmental problems see e.g. Barrett (1989) , Carraro, Siniscalco (1991) and Welsch (1992) . This paper will question the standard results of an international non-cooperative reduction game. Scope effects and externalities are apt to modify these results essentially. Thus, the resulting ambiguity surrounding any theoretical forecast even in these static scenarios demands a careful investigation of the crucial parameters. The paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents a model of interdependent reduction and adaptation policies. Chapter 3 compares the non-cooperative with the cooperative outcome, considers the slope of the reaction curves and discusses the role of different conjectures. Chapter 4 deals with corner solutions in the non-cooperative setting because sufficiently strong scope effects are able to render the second-order-conditions non-fulfilled. Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
A Model of Reduction and Adaptation Policies
Modelling interdependent reduction and adaptation policies means enlarging the standard static approach of global pollution problems. Let qj (qp and x ; (xp denote the reduction efforts and adaptational investments of country i (j). For the sake of simplicity, quadratic functions will represent costs and benefits:
(1) Bj = a ; Q -Pj/2 Q 2 + Yi xj -6j/2 X; 2 + 8; Q x; -co ; Xj Bj = Oj Q -pj/2 Q 2 + Yj Xj -Sj/2 Xj -2 + Ej Q X,--o)j Xj dp P i; Yi> &i> EpOj. Pj> Yj. 6j, £j > 0, Q = q ; + qj < min {Pj/cti, Pj/ctj}, qj, qj > 0, xj < Sj/q, Xj < Sj/Cj Total benefits consist of benefits which originate from the degree of total reductions, of benefits which originate from the degree of national adaptational investments, of the beneficial scope effects and of the externality effect. Scope and externality effects enter the benefit functions lineary which will simplify the discussion of conjectures and second-order-conditions in the following chapters significantly. Several specific policy options fit into the logic of scope effects. E.g., consider a country which faces the risks of droughts because the release of greenhouse gases heats the atmosphere up. Besides reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the country can opt to install an irrigation infrastructure in order to mitigate harvest losses. In this case, an increase in greenhouse gas reductions can improve the marginal productivity of irrigation measures because lower global change risks improve the insurance against famines which is provided by irrigation. Alternatively, adaptation can entail incentives to emigrate in order to preserve a certain living standard for the remaining population. This actual danger which troubles many politicians in industrialized countries can originate from adaptation policies because a decrease or non-increase of the domestic population can improve the success of reduction policies.
Both examples shed also some light on the externality effects of adaptation policies which are indicated by the sign of co. The pressure of imigration illustrates most dramatically the seemingly harmful effect of adaptations. Erecting an irrigation infrastructure can represent a negative externality, too, because it can shorten the water availability in the other country significantly. Both effects confirm that managing specific pollution issues merely transfers the pollution problem to another agent (Bird (1987) ). However, also positive externalities are conceivable. E.g., erecting dykes and dams to protect lowland against a rising sea level can also protect the lowland of the other country behind.
Reductions and adaptations incur costs which are given by
(2) q= e;/2 qi 2 Cj= 6j/2 qj 2 e i; 9j > o and
The basic structure of this model implies that country i (j) is not helpless in influencing the degree of externalities which are lineary dependent on the adaptation policy of j (i).
Any variation of i's (j's) reduction efforts changes the adaptation policy of j (i) through the economies of scope. Hence, a country fearing substantial negative externalities can mitigate these effects by changing its own reduction plans. The next chapter will take these effects into account when different conjectures are considered.
Cooperative and Non-Cooperative International Policies
This chapter assumes that the sufficient second-order-conditions are fulfilled for the cooperative and non-cooperative solution. The appendix deals with these conditions explicitly and the following chapter will pick up corner solutions. Let U denote the sum of the net benefits of both countries. If a cooperative agreement assignes equal weights to each country's net benefits, the maximization of U with respect to the four instrument variables indicates the optimal cooperative solution:
(4)
The lack of a cooperative agreement induces every country to take only the effects of its own policy instruments on its own net benefits into account. Chapter 2 has already mentioned that the reduction policy can vary the degree of externalities. Without going into detail now, let (5) In the case of mutual negative externalities, comparing (6) and (4) indicates that foregone benefits due to neglecting the harmful impacts of one country's adaptation policies on the other country supplement the foregone benefits due to non-cooperative reduction policies. According to (7),
Sj + Kj 6: + K:
the adaptation policy is solely dependent on the reduction policies. Inserting (7) into the first and third line of (6) gives the reaction curves of i and j: 
The higher the second derivatives of the reduction cost functions, i.e. 0j and 8;, are the larger is the range of £j and Ej which fulfill (10). However, large 0s do not imply a steep inclination of the reaction curve because they dominate the numerator and the denominator of the quotients in (9). These quotients approach 1 as 6 increases which results in a negligibly positive slope.
Thus, a sufficiently strong scope effect is able to initiate positive reactions. In such a case, if country i (j) increases its reduction efforts, country j (i) will react by increasing its reduction efforts, too, because the change in benefits via the scope term is so strong that own reduction efforts must be increased to balance the cost-weighted marginal benefits of reductions and adaptations. This effect deserves careful attention because the positive reaction does not originate from signalling strategies or even tacit agreements. Positive reactions originate from non-cooperative maximization. An increase of q: increases the marginal productivity of x ; which must be compensated by an increase in q { to maximize net benefits. A marginal balancing of Xj and q; is necessary to adapt optimally to an external productivity shift. If this partial effect overcompensates the partial free-rider-effect, the reaction curve will be sloped upwards.
includes a zero | H k |. A zero | H k | is ruled out here for reasons of better tractability.
To elaborate the equilibrium values of qj and q;, defining some new terms is convenient: <*i ( 6 i " K i) + e i Yi a j ( 6 j " Kj) + Ej Yj 2 2 Tj = CO; (6i + K;) Tj = COj (6j + Kj)
This model assumes that 2; and 2; are non-negative because negative reductions do not make sense even for zero reductions of the other country. Inserting these terms into (8) I now introduce three different types of conjectures concerning the abilities of a country to assess the influence of own reduction policies on the degree of externalities. They reflect different degrees of a country's "policy sophistication":
The case of ignorance supposes no influence on the externalities:
The case of partial integration recognizes that, due to (5), an increase of reductions causes an increase of externalities: (C3) ±(1 + <D) L dq; Sj + K; dqj 6j + K ;
Starting with discussing the case of ignorance for both countries, it is evident that the existence of economies of scope -measured by E ; and E; -unambiguously mitigates the free-rider-effect which standard models observe. The introduction of non-negative ES increases 2j, 2:, <£j and <&: and thus the equilibrium values q-* and q:*. For the case of ignorance, this result holds independent of the signs of T ; and T:.
Conjectures C2 and C3 change the equilibrium values dependent on the signs of Tj and T:. Table 1 summarizes the nine possible combinations of equilibrium values.
[ Table 1 about here]
The The appendix proves that any unambiguous sign cannot be confirmed if both countries anticipate the effects of their policies according to C2 or C3. Hence, any reaction to a change in either scope term is conceivable if the agents take the effects of their policy on the degree of externalities into account.
Corner Solutions in the Non-Cooperative Setting
The previous chapter has ruled out corner solutions by assuming negative definiteness.
However, scope effects are apt to conflict with negative definiteness. Thus, this chapter will address non-cooperative corner solutions and compare them with the cooperative outcome. Whenever this chapter will use second-order-results, the reader is referred to the appendix for details.
First observe that d 2 Q k /dq k 2 = d 2 Q k /dq k dq, = 0 for any k,l E {i,j}. Hence, conjectures are not relevant for the second-order-conditions in this model. Taking country i as an example, suppose that (12) (P i+ ej)(6 i+ Kj)-Ei 2(= |Ei 2 |)<0
holds. (12) indicates that the first-order-conditions now represent a minimum. The scope effects are so strong that an interior solution cannot be optimal for i.
But (12) does not necessarily imply that one of the conditions of negative semidefiniteness for the cooperative solution is also violated. ,e o, 3 The functional form rules the no-policy-variant out.
The parameters determine the superiority of the relevant policy option. The free-ridereffect with respect to reductions indicates intuitively that a focus on adaptation is probable when (12) holds. To elaborate the concrete figure, (17) and (15) must be inserted into the benefit functions and compared with each other. No superiority of a specific policy can be confirmed on purely theoretical grounds but both optimal levels depend on q:. It is interesting how a change in q: changes the difference between the net benefits of an exclusive reduction and those of an exclusive adaptation policy. Define -UjC^qp -UjCxjC qj ): Using (15) and (17) The sign of dAj/dq; depends on the sign of the last term. Recall that 8j 2 > ((3j + 6j) (6j + Kj). Hence, . These results also prove the intuitively plain idea that concentrating on adaptive investments is relatively better the higher j's reduction efforts are because the benefits of the scope effects can only arise in the case of adaptation policies. Table 3 summarizes, the different conceivable scenarios of corner solutions.
[ Table 3 about here]
This chapter has demonstrated that the chances for reduction policies are low if the second-order-conditions are not fulfilled. Assuming no reductions of the other country, one can expect an exclusive adaptation policy because it is a salient feature of most public goods problems that the individual marginal benefits fall short from the marginal costs. If this result holds, it also holds for any positive reductions of the other country. Therefore, very strong economies of scope induce no reductions whereas the standard Note that the Apfunction is concave because &i+ Kj Pi + BjJ dq-2 <O. 
Summary and Conclusions
This paper has shown that scope and externality effects introduce a good deal of ambiguity surrounding any theoretical forecast. Scope effects can induce positively sloped reaction curves with respect to reduction efforts. They can explain the seemingly irrational "commitments" of a country to foster unilateral reductions (Hoel (1991) ). When strong economies of scope exist which a country has not yet taken into account, increased reduction efforts can maximize the net benefits. Thus, these commitments can originate from an efficient strategy which exploits the dominant economies of scope.
The different conjectures shed some light on managing externalities which are due to the other country's adaptation policy. They increase the degree of ambiguity with respect to the equilibrium values significantly even if asymmetric conjecture combinations are ruled out. Different conjectures set the stage for strategic policy variants. Dropping the assumption of a one-shot-game, they can serve as a basis to enlarge the approach in order to include several stages of a repeating game. However, I doubt whether a multi-stage approach will be able to resolve ambiguity.
Strong scope effects are also able to violate the second-order-conditions. Whenever an exclusive adaptation policy is superior for zero reductions of the other country, it is always superior. Hence, scope effects can even conflict with the pessimistic standard non-cooperative results which produce too low, but still positive reduction efforts. Their strength must be carefully taken into consideration when discussing international reduction games. The last two determinants must be compared with | D 2 2 1 and | D^21, respectively, to elaborate the set of (3j and (3: which fulfill the second-order-conditions in the cooperative but not in the non-cooperative setting.
Differentiations with respect to £j 38;
(1 -(D i cD j )2
Disentangling the terms gives: Both supplements are ambiguous in sign and responsible for a total ambiguity. In the case of total integration, the suppl(C2)'s themselves must be modified. Straightforward calculations show that the suppl(C3)'s do not remove ambiguity because they neither add the first summand nor substract the second one. 
